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Western German Staybehind Planning

1. Western German staybehind planning has received serious review and consideration here during the past few weeks. On the basis of a survey of Washington files and a debriefing of _____ we are prompted to set down our candid opinion of the situation as we see it and make some suggestions which we feel might be used in a fresh approach to the problems inherent in this phase of our operational planning. We appreciate the past efforts of the individuals involved in this work, and we shall not propose to do away with what assets they have already developed. Instead, we hope to aid in redirecting the staybehind effort.

2. The Plan. Our staybehind objectives in Western Germany is to develop and maintain certain stayable assets which we can activate when they are needed to cover priority targets in the event of hostilities. Because we do not know when we shall need them, our planning should be such that we could depend on our current assets tomorrow if the need arose, yet be flexible enough to enable us to preserve these assets for as long as is necessary. We do not propose that we should give every trained W/T operator the necessary equipment as soon as he is trained nor do we suggest that the members of each unit be put in touch with one another immediately. Rather, we feel that detailed plans should be spelled out so that activation could take place anytime with a minimum of confusion while keeping within practical limits of security. Such an overall plan must be based on (a) the targets we wish to cover, (b) our current and potential assets, and (c) the local conditions under which we work. In addition, the overall plan should include consideration of the current non-KIBITZ agents who have stayability and who are not already compromised. The individuals in this group should not be introduced into the staybehind units now, but we must spell out detailed plans for their activation and connection with W/T units. This part of the planning cannot be done by the KIBITZ case officers but it should receive consideration in the field headquarters operations section.

3. The Targets. Undoubtedly, we are all agreed that we cannot hope to blanket Western Germany with staybehind units. Such an undertaking would be impossible in light of our limited manpower and facilities. Therefore, we

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must also our coverage at the most important targets. We could approach the Defense Department here for a list of such targets but we are sure that in doing so we would initiate lengthy negotiations during which HOOB as well as SHAPE would probably be queried. Because it is important to have the military views on this subject, we suggest that an informal approach to a qualified officer in the G-3 Office at HOOB either through the ZACACUS officer in that Office or directly by one of our own staff would produce the same information. We would not be asking for HOOB's war plans; all we need is a listing of targets in order of priority which will need coverage in the event of hostilities. Should we be unable to obtain this information from HOOB, then a couple of our senior men in Germany could sit down with a map and come up with a valid list of tactically important targets. This listing will include areas outside the present limits of the U.S. Zone, but since the normal boundaries will soon disappear we shall be able to direct our efforts towards targets in other areas of Western Germany. In this connection, the ZIPIER report dated 6 July 1951 contains an exhaustive list of priority targets throughout Western Germany; it is therefore possible that this report should be taken into account in any target planning. (b)

h. Present Assets. In the course of discussions here we hit upon the arbitrary figure of twelve priority targets which could receive our immediate attention. For various reasons you may decide that you will want to consider a different number, but in any event we should have an immediate goal in sight which can be expanded at some future date. Whatever the case, our next step would be to take a long look at what assets we already have to determine which of the units or individuals can be utilized to cover these targets. In all probability some of the targets will be wholly or partially covered and we might consider moving some of our present assets to cover other of the targets. We realize that it is much easier to write about this last suggestion than to do it, but it could be done in some cases.

5. KIRITZ 15. In my review of our present set-up in Western Germany we suggest that particular attention be paid to the growing empire of KIRITZ 15. His independent network is rapidly becoming an amorphous mass of people and units about which we know very little, and over which we have only indirect control. Although he has shown remarkable aggressiveness and organizational ability in spotting and approaching those 70 individuals, we suspect that we are sacrificing security for questionable quantity. We believe that the success of our stepchild program will depend upon individuals who are independently spotted, recruited, and trained and who are activated as individuals or units according to carefully laid plans. Because K-15 is recruiting from the ranks of former military associates, we assume that many of the recruits know one another and may, therefore, learn of one another's activities for K-15. Such a situation weakens the whole K-15 show security-wise. We also feel that anyone in Germany who approaches so many of the ex-military for intelligence work will eventually come to the attention of ZIPIER. One of our primary considerations is to keep our stepchild plans completely separate from ZIPIER since we must have an independent reporting network to check information which may reach us with special ZIPIER coloring. In our opinion K-15's show needs some careful scrutiny with special emphasis on an analysis of the inter-relationships among the separate units and individuals. Such an analysis should be made on the assumption that there is something and so security-wise, for we would much rather be proven wrong in

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this assumption than to discover later that our investment in K-15 was in vain. If we find that the network is sound, then we should aim it towards the priority targets, keeping it separate from our independent KIBITZ coverage.

5. Recruitment. Our future recruitment plans should be built around the targets. With a specific target in mind we can concentrate on a plan which is tailored to suit the local area and the type of target we are to cover. If the target is an important rail terminal, for example, the ideal recruit would be a rail official whose peculiar talents will assure his stayability. Should he not be suitable for W/T training we should find someone in the target area who could become the channel for the information and recruit this individual independently.

6. Motivation. We should not promise or imply to any prospective recruit that he will eventually become an integral part of the future German military units. If a recruit leads with this question we should point out to him that his life may some day depend on the fact that he remains an independent unit and as such he cannot be compromised by connections with other staybehind activities. While this argument may not have the same patriotic forcefulness as the asked-for promise, it certainly has its selling points to any man.

7. W/T Training. It appears that one of the thorniest problems in this work has been the training of W/T operators. You know better than we the headaches involved with security, transportation, personnel availability, and cover. You might obviate some of these day-to-day problems by the use of a couple of Army communications trucks, properly outfitted, as mobile W/T training units. With the commo instructor in uniform and a GI driver you could bring the water to the horse with no less security, we think, than in the use of scattered safe houses throughout the area. With the increasing number of Army vehicles on the scene we believe that one or two more Army trucks parked along the roadside would not arouse an overabundance of curiosity.

8. Intelligence Training. Although we agree that W/T recruitment and training should have priority over training for intelligence reporting, we feel that the latter instruction should be considered in the plans, and that, when given, it should be based on the type of target (or targets) the reporter is to cover.

9. Concealment of Equipment. Thus far most of the W/T sets and other equipment have been put under ground, and the recovery of the sets has shown our previous packaging to be inadequate. While we are hopeful that the new container designed by the Bureau of Standards for ZACADBY will fill the bill for future planting, we would like to go on record as favoring the use of more varied methods for the concealment of equipment. Caching the equipment in the care of trusted agents (who may or may not be the subsequent users) is one possibility. There are numerous other possibilities of above-ground caching which should be studied for the purpose of determining the most secure and practical methods. Then by careful planning, incorporating a variety of the best possible methods, we will not have to depend entirely on burials. No matter what concealment method is used, we should have complete details of the concealment on file here.

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10. Burial Team. Underground burials will still play an important role in our concealment program. We feel that the physical task of packaging the equipment and burying it consumes too much case officer time. Since the burial is usually done at night and is not a gravy-train job, we suggest that a burial squad be formed to relieve the case officers for the planning, recruitment, and training chores. We realize that the utilization of field assistants in this job will depend upon the overall manpower requirements and availability in the German station, but we feel that the formation of a burial team should be seriously considered even if we are forced to obtain personnel for it from the Army.

11. Staybehind Teams. While ideal security calls for one-man units, we all appreciate the fact that it is not always feasible nor desirable for one man to be both the intelligence gatherer and the radio operator. We should not go off the deep end, however, and studiously fill out our teams just to make teams, nor should we bring the members of each team together during the development of the team. The size of the team will depend upon the type of target to be covered and the local conditions under which the team will function. We feel strongly that there should not be more than three individuals on each team, but we admit that in certain cases there will be exceptions. We dislike the formation of teams wherein the first recruit builds up his unit with brothers-in-law and friends. This ingrown method of expansion might lead to serious security flaps and wasted effort should one of the team members go sour or just decide to bow out of the game. The plans for each team should spell out the compartmentation of the individuals involved and also the method we will use to bring them together when we want to do so. This brings us to the \$64 question.

12. Activation. We are thankful that there are no policy directives on such fluid questions as, "When shall we give the agent the equipment or the information he needs to recover the equipment", and "When and how shall we bring the individuals on a team together". Our contention is that we cannot hope to activate any units if, at the outset, we assume that some fine day we shall be duly alerted by the amber light so that we will have all the time needed to contact our far-flung staybehinders. With adequate, detailed, practical planning, activation should come off quietly and securely because provision has been made for the agent to take certain steps which will lead him to the equipment or to a tree stump where further instructions await him. For example, the case officer could hand the agent a sealed envelope after we are as sure as we'll ever be of the agent's bona-fides with instructions not to open the envelope until after a certain period following hostile occupation. This envelope could contain the directions for the recovery of the equipment or instructions which would lead the agent to a dead drop where further details could be obtained. During subsequent visits to the agent, the case officer could examine the envelope to check for tampering. Should other developments change our plans for either the agent or the equipment, it would be a simple matter to change the contents of the envelope. The variety of gimmicks which can be used for activation is limited only by the case officer's imagination and his knowledge of the local conditions, provided that each method planned is flexible and within practical security limitations.

13. We hope that the foregoing discussion, general as it may be, will serve as a stimulus for a re-examination of our staybehind efforts in Western

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Germany. We have purposely avoided consideration of BOB's staybehind operations and will write separately on their problems. [has been assigned the responsibility for handling the Washington end of this business and we feel that in the future we will be able to give you better support. Because no one person here has had this responsibility on a continuing basis, we have failed to make the contributions we should have made. We think that the subject is timely and important, and we look forward to receiving your reactions as soon as you have had sufficient opportunity to study this outline.]

cc: BOB
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